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Abstract
In this work we study an economic agent based model under different asymmetric
information degrees. This model is quite simple and can be treated analytically since
the buyers evaluate the quality of a certain good taking into account only the qual-
ity of the last good purchased plus her perceptive capacity β. As a consequence the
system evolves according to a stationary Markovian stochastic process. The value
of a product offered by the seller increases with quality according to the exponent
α, which is a measure of technology. It incorporates all the technological capac-
ity of production systems such as education, scientific development and techniques
that change the productivity growth. The technological level plays an important
role to explain how the asymmetry of information may affect the market evolution
in this model [3]. We observe that, for high technological levels, the market can
control adverse selection. The model allows us to compute the maximum asymmet-
ric information degree before market collapse. Below this critical point the market
evolves during a very limited time and then dies out completely. When β is closer
to 1 (symmetric information), the market becomes more profitable for high quality
goods, although high and low quality markets coexist. All the results we obtained
from the model are analytical and the maximum asymmetric information level is a
consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process of quality evaluation.
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Evolution
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1 Introduction
There is an increasing interest in microscopic models to investigate the mech-
anism that drives the market [1,2,6]. In particular, researchers have focused
on analytical and simple models that are able to capture some real aspects of
the economic activity.
Akerlof analyzed in [1] the impact of asymmetric information on the market.
Agents trade in the market because they share mutual benefits. However,
when the information asymmetry increases, high quality goods drop out from
market and only low quality goods can be traded, a situation called adverse
selection.
Adverse selection is characterized as pre-contractual opportunistic behavior,
since agents act in order to obtain more advantages, given the market condi-
tions and information available on the contracts that regulate their commercial
relations. Rules established in such contracts end up attracting more intensely
those agents that it should repel (for example, the case of health insurance,
which attracts more sick than healthy individuals).
In the simple model proposed by Y-C Zhang [4], Arkelof’s market failure is
a special case. He revisited supply and demand laws by setting quality and
imperfect information as the key ingredients. By varying continuously the
information asymmetry parameter one observes two regimes. For some inter-
mediate level of asymmetry consumers’ benefits and firms’ profits approach
the maximum. In this case, both cooperate and firms invest in educating con-
sumers to identify their goods’ qualities. After this maximum benefits still
increase while profits decrease and consumers and producers are in conflict.
One solution for this dilemma is product innovation.
Recently, Wang et. al [2] introduced an agent based model to address the
impact of asymmetric information on the market evolution. They showed the
emergence of adverse selection from the simulation of a very simple markovian
model. For instance, the market of used goods is not completely explained in
terms of asymmetric information [3]. To improve market understanding, it was
introduced another variable called valuation ratio, defined as the gap between
buyers’ valuation (consumers’ willingness to pay) and the sellers’ valuation
(firms’ cost) about the same good under the situation of complete information.
The coexistence of high and low quality is a consequence of a trade-off between
buyers’ perception of product quality and large valuation ratio.
It is worth to note that in the model we do not take into account the quantity
of produced goods. From the microeconomic theory, we know that it is relevant
to understand the supply and demand law. However, as noted by Zhang [4],
products in the economy are more complex. Both quality and information play
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important roles in the understanding of how market behaves. The consumer’s
perception depends on the amount of information available, becoming crucial
for the agent when it comes to evaluate the good and make decision.
We are not considering here the produced quantity. The relevant aspect is
only the product quality. Since in this study the amount of goods produced
do not matter, the model is suitable to describe the economy of information
(software companies, e-books, films production, and so for). In such context
the key feature are abstract aspects (knowledge, design and creativity) and
the replication cost is cheap (or the marginal cost is constant). Consequently,
the prototype is cheap to replicate but hard to define the selling price, which
depends on the product quality and the ability of consumers to recognize it.
In this work, we study a market model discussed above under some fixed
technological production levels and several asymmetric information degrees
[1,2]. The model is developed on consumer’s and firm’s perceptions of value
attributable to the good, regardless the market prices.
2 Model
There are Ns sellers that offer goods with different integer quality equally
distributed in the range [1, ..., κ] and Nb buyers which have access to all goods
in the market. At each step the buyer i chooses one seller at random and
evaluates the quality q she is buying according to the expression
qi = βk + (1− β) k
i
a, (1)
where β ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of asymmetric information, k is the quality of
goods informed by the seller to the consumers and kia is the quality of the
last item purchased by the agent i. The buyer recognizes the real quality of
the item (the one attached by the seller) only after purchasing it, and this
quality is used as the next kia. For β = 1 the information is both perfect and
symmetric, that is, the two groups share the same quality perception. As β
decreases the consumers are no longer able to precisely identify the products’
quality (though they are not aware of it). The asymmetry of information
emerges from the different perceptions between sellers and buyers about the
same product, and the buyers’ inability to assign the product its true quality
raises an imperfect state of information (although it is still perfect on the
seller’s side). The asymmetry reaches its maximum when β equals zero, making
it impossible for the buyers to have any idea about the quality of the good
she is purchasing.
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Consumers and firms may disagree on how much a good is worth (actually
they do), so it is not expected they would agree on a value assigned to it or
even on how much should cost a difference in the quality of a product. In this
sense, we consider two distinct ways for buyers and sellers to assign a value
to the product, depending on its quality. The consumers have a valuation
function
V bi (k; k
i
a) = Aqi, (2)
where A is a rate of the buyer‘s willingness to pay, while the sellers compute the
minimum value of their goods by taking into account the actual manufacturing
technological state of the economy α and the monetary scale of sales B via
V s (k) = Bkα, (3)
with α > 0 and B > 0. A commercial transaction occurs only when
V b(k; kia) ≥ V
s(k), (4)
otherwise the buyer chooses randomly another seller in the next step.
The consumers’ willingness to pay is linked to the value she concedes to the
good, which includes the valuation of a set of attributes she values most at
acquisition of a certain type of product or service (for example, durability,
quality, color, taste, size, shape, sophistication, luxury, among others). If the
sum of those valuations given to the good falls below the firms production
cost (that is, in principle, the minimum value that the firm is willing to accept
to sell the good, which includes the firms’ opportunity costs), no trade trans-
action occurs. No consumer will accept to pay a price higher than the value
established by her willingness to pay, since her perception of the attributes
the good will provide do not compensate the utility of the money she is giving
up.
When one computes the marginal value ∂kV
s(k), three regimes may result
according to the α parameter value. For α < 1 the technological state of the
economy is marginally more efficient, i.e, cheaper than the case of α > 1
where the derivative decreases as the quality increases (the marginal value is
constant when α = 1). It is possible to associate α with the economy state of
technology because a seller may produce the same product with a lower cost
by decreasing the α value.
In a bargaining trading process the price will be somewhere between the con-
sumer‘s willingness to pay V b (k; ka) and the firm‘s cost V
s (k). The discussion
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on the differences between price and value involves lots of controversy, includ-
ing the differentiation between value in use and value in exchange, according
to Adam Smith [6], ”no trade occurs if the value in use of a good is lower
than its value in exchange”. That is, whenever a trade occurs, the value in
use (utility of the good for the consumer) is usually significantly higher than
value in exchange (market price), and the later should be at least equal to or
higher than the production cost. Based on this observation we define the rela-
tive profit as γ = V
b
V s
just to avoid introducing a sophisticated price dynamics
model.
Our focus is on the impact of asymmetric information under fixed technological
level in the evolution of the market. The buyer’s quality evaluation mechanism
follows a markovian process since only the more recent state is relevant for
computing the next quality. We study the maximum asymmetric information
for the market to reach a stationary state. Also, we discuss the consumer‘s
average observed quality for several asymmetric information levels and the
average number of transactions per round.
3 The stationary probability distribution of the traded quality
In each round a buyer chooses one seller at random, who will offer her a
product of quality k. The probability pv (k, ka) for the transaction to occur is
given by
pv (k, ka) = Pr
[
V b (k, ka) ≥ V
s (k)
]
= Pr [βk + (1− β) ka ≥ λk
α] , (5)
where λ = B/A and ka is the last product purchased by the buyer. For this
buyer’s next round, her ka will either be the same or change to k, depending
on the result of this transaction. In this way one can describe the buyer’s
behavior as a stochastic process, where her state n is defined by the quality
of her last purchased good, which may remain the same if condition (4) if
not fulfilled (or if she is trying to purchase the same quality) or undergo a
transaction n → m whenever she tries to acquire a new good with quality
m. The transition between states must be probabilistic since the new seller is
chosen at random, and the use de Heaviside’s step function Θ (x) guarantees
that only accessible states are reached. Describing the transition probabilities
as
Pr (n→ m) =
1
Ns
Θ [βm+ (1− β)n− λmα] , (6)
Pr (n→ n) =
1
Ns
Θ (n− λnα) +
1
Ns
Ns∑
w=1
Θ [λwα − βw − (1− β)n] . (7)
5
one can define a transition matrix T with elements Tnm = Pr (m→ n), and
set a vector Pt describing the probability of the buyer to be found in each state
of the system. The expression for the stochastic process given by Pt+1 = TPt,
where the stationary solution Π = TΠ may be obtained by either diagonal-
izing the T matrix (in order to find the eigenvector with eigenvalue equal
to unity) or numerically by iterating the equation until the convergence is
reached.
The α parameter plays an important role in the model because it affects the
state of the economy depending on the values it may assume. By considering
a condition when a trade can not occur (V b < V s) and β = 1, it is possible
to find out the conditions for the market to exist. If α ≥ 1, then we must
have λ ≤ 1, as for the case when α < 1 the condition λ ≤ κ1−α must hold.
Given that λ satisfies either of this conditions, three different market pictures
arise, depending on the technological state α: α > 1 gives rise to a forbbiden
high quality region above kˆ = λ
1
1−α , independently of β; for α < 1 a forbbiden
low quality region below kˆ emerges when β = 1, but it becomes allowed as β
decreases; if α = 1 no prohibitive region appears.
In Fig.1 we show the stationary solution Π (k), with α = 1
2
and λ = 10,
for several asymmetric information levels β. For perfect information (β = 1)
there is no transaction below k ≤ λ2 = 100. Thus, the distribution probability
Π is uniform in the interval [λ2, . . . , κ], the buyers can purchase any goods
available in the market because there is no budget constraint in this model.
When the asymmetry of information arises, but is still close to 1, it becomes
possible to purchase products at a quality lower than λ2. For β values much
lower than 1, the distribution probability Π has a peak in this lowest quality
region indicating the adverse selection phenomena. In the stationary state, the
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Fig. 1. Probability distribution Π as a function of quality k. Information asymmetry
rises the probability of negotiation for low quality
probability Π(k) for a buyer to be on the kth state may be associated with the
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probability of his last purchased item be k, since Pt+1 = Pt = Π. This allows
one to calculate the vendor’s probability to sell a product to one unspecified
buyer using (5),
pk =
κ∑
k′=1
pv (k, k
′) =
κ∑
k′=1
Θ [βk + (1− β) k′ − λkα] Π (k′) . (8)
that is, the probability of the seller k to perform a transaction given that she
was chosen by one buyer.
It is worth to note that, for fixed α < 1 there is a maximum asymmetric
information degree for the market to exist given by some critical value βc. This
points out to the condition for the occurrence of Akerlof‘s lemmon market:
association of low quality goods with an environment of high information
asymmetry leads to low willingness to pay by consumers and high production
cost by firms (λ > 1). For instance, taking λ = 10 we obtain βc = 0.319. In
what follows we run all the simulation for β ∈ [0.32, . . . , 1]. To get an analytical
curve for βc we observe that for a buyer in the state ka = 1 the trade condition
below a certain asymmetric information degree βc is never satisfied, even if
the buyer meets the highest quality goods in the market (which she values the
most), and the market evolves to extinction. In other words, ka = 1 becomes an
absorbing state, and all agents (buyers) will eventually collapse to it. Taking
V b (κ, 1) = V s (κ) and β = βc, we get
βc (κ) =
λκα − 1
κ− 1
. (9)
Also if V b (κ, 1) = V s (κ) holds, then for any state n > 1 we have V b (κ, n) ≥
V s (κ), which means that if ka = 1 is not an absorbing state then there are
no absorbing states in the system 1 . In this way, the maximum asymmetric
information level is a consequence of an ergodicity breakdown in the process
of quality evaluation.
The completeness of the system (accessibility of all states) is guaranteed if the
condition
κ ≥
λ− β
1− β
(10)
holds, but it’s only valid in the region β < 1, since for β = 1 the existence of
states where the buyer’s valuation is below the seller’s level is not allowed.
1 There exist at least one state available for each n > 1.
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From equation (9), one may see that there is an interval where the parameter λ
has some interest. Noting that 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 we get κ1−α ≤ λ ≤ κ−α. Beyond the
lower limit of λ the market is never affected by the level of information since
buyer may always buy any product in the market. On the other extreme, the
market collapses because buyers underestimate all qualities, not paying the
value asked by the sellers.
4 Statistics
To obtain all statistical quantities of interest we need to take into account the
probability of a seller to be chosen by n buyers in one single run. Given Ns
sellers and Nb buyers, let Xk be a random variable that represents the number
of buyers that choose the seller k in some round. So,
P (Xn = 0) =
(
Ns − 1
Ns
)Nb
. (11)
Each buyer chooses only one seller at each step. From the seller viewpoint
the probability to be chosen by exactly n buyers is described by a binomial
distribution
P (Xk = n) = Pr (n) =
Nb!
n! (Nb − n)!
(Ns − 1)
Nb−n
NNbs
. (12)
Now we obtain an expression for the probability of some seller k to perform
exactly j transactions, given that he was chosen by n buyers (n ≥ j). Again,
since the probability of a seller k actually sell to Yk = j buyers follows a
binomial process where the Bernoulli trial has the weights pk (8), the result is
P (Yk = j|Xk = n) =
n!
j! (n− j)!
pjk (1− pk)
n−j . (13)
Note that, when the system reaches the stationary state, we can use the ergodic
property to calculate the temporal average number of transaction per run due
to the seller k as a sum over all states of the system:
〈trans(k)〉=
Nb∑
n=0
nP (Yk = n) =
Nb∑
n=0
n
Nb∑
i=n
Pr (i)P (Yk = j|Xk = n)
=
Nb!
NNbs
Nb∑
n=0
Nb∑
i=n
(Ns − 1)
Nb−i pnk (1− pk)
i−n
(Nb − i)! (i− n)! (n− 1)!
. (14)
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where P (Yk = n) is the probability of a seller sell exactly n units of goods.
Let P (k|k′) the probability that, given some buyer state k′, some seller k will
do business. We write this as
P (k|k′) =
Θ [βk + (1− β) k′ − λkα] Π (k′)∑Nb
k′=1Θ [βk + (1− β) k
′ − λkα] Π (k′)
(15)
So, the average of any quantity written as a function of k and k′ denoted by
Oˆ (k; k′) can be obtained via
〈O (k)〉 =
Nb∑
k′=1
Oˆ (k; k′)P (k|k′) (16)
5 Results and Discussions
In this section we will analyze some quantities obtained from simulation to
check the results expressed in equation (16). Again, we set up Ns = Nb = 1000,
λ = 10 and α = 0.5 since our interest is focused on the analytical expression.
Our main interests are the individual averages of the number of transactions,
the valuation ratio and the observed quality by buyers. The average number
of transactions (per round) gives a measure of firms efficiency to sell their
products, but it must be analyzed together with the valuation rate γ (k) =
V b(k)/V s(k), because companies in general tend to maximize their expected
profit according to a strategy that may last longer than a single run, i.e., a firm
may choose either to make less transactions on a time step with a higher profit
or to sell her product to as many consumers as possible with a lower margin.
As far as the buyers’ perception play an important role in the model, each
firm’s observed average quality tells us how the buyers evaluate the quality of
its product. If the consumer overestimates the quality of the product, trade
will occur only if the willingness to pay is high enough to afford it, otherwise
we expect the buyer to give up the purchase. Quality underestimation may
also occur on regions where the value assigned by the consumer with perfect
information is much higher than the sellers, but it leads to a lower margin
profit. So asymmetric information is not always advantageous to firms, since
the average number of transactions and/or the relative gain may decrease, and
in high levels, it may even cause the market’s collapse.
When it comes to analyze the average number of transactions made by each
firm, the state of symmetric information forbids all sellers with quality below
the k = 100 plateau to make any transaction, because the consumers’ evalua-
tion is below the sellers’ evaluation. Above this plateau, each seller is equally
likely to sell her product, averaging one transaction each round.
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As β decreases, one recognizes that a valley appears in the region between
high and low qualities. Even extremely low quality products become tradeable,
reaching almost the same transaction level observed for that products with su-
perior quality (Fig. 2). The average valuation ratio 〈γ (k)〉 (Fig. 3), in the sym-
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Fig. 2. Average Number of Transactions as a function of quality k.
metric information case, increase monotonically with the increasing of quality.
By introducing asymmetry in the information low quality goods become more
profitable. In other words, as β decreases to βc the valuation ratio invert com-
pletely its behavior. But it is in the quality mid-region [k ∼ 50, k ∼ 800] that
an interesting behavior emerges. A significant lower level of transactions ap-
pears, becoming larger as β approaches its critical level βc (affecting more
products during the transition), while the valley deepness appears to decrease
from β ≈ 0.9 to β ≈ 0.5, and to increase from β ≈ 0.5 until it reaches its
maximum level at βc = 0.32, as one can see in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 3. Value ratio γ = V b(k)/V s(k), i.e. the gap between value given by buyer over
the value due to the seller as a function of quality k.
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The relative gain γ (k) allows us to compare the relative firms’ profit as a
function of the quality k for several β values. In the symmetric information
case γ is an increasing function, showing that it is more profitable to produce
high quality goods.
Information asymmetry makes the low quality region become more profitable,
which can be interpreted as an incentive for firms produce low quality goods.
This is a consequence of the goods quality overestimation by buyers. We note
that the minimum profit depends on β and moves from low to high quality
level, in particular, for β = βc the minimum γ is the highest quality product.
It is important to note that when β is close to βc it becomes difficult for
buyer to recognize the real product quality . Below the critical point β =
βc the buyers move away from the market because they become unable to
distinguish the goods’ quality. This is the reason pointed out by Arkelof to
explain the market failure, caused by information asymmetry associated with
high variation in the quality of goods produced.
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The general model overview is that an environment of perfect and symmetric
information enables consumers to purchase products which they think are
fairly evaluated. When their perception β decreases from β = 1.0 to βc, low
quality goods are traded in the market less frequently than those with high
quality. The effect of reducing the information level is the decrease in the
average rate of transactions. For a high information asymmetry (β ≈ βc),
less transactions take place, mostly concentrated on very low and very high
quality level goods. When the firms’ quality decrease, the trade probability
also decreases (see Fig. 2) and so does the average transaction rate. However,
we see in the Fig. 1 that there is a peak in the distribution Π (k) in the region
k ≤ λ
1
1−α , which explains the increasing transaction rate in this region for
β ≈ βc.
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6 Conclusions
The simplicity of the model allowed us to solve it analytically using the Marko-
vian chain approach. The existence of stationary solutions is a condition for
the systems to avoid the collapse. The model can be split in three regimes,
according to the value of technological level α. The role of the technology is
to increase productivity and to reduce cost. In particular, we focused the an-
alyzes on high technological regime (α = 1
2
) since the economy evolves toward
increasing efficiency.
The role of the asymmetric information is to enhance the low quality market.
We showed that the consumers overestimate the quality of goods below the
medium quality level. Thus the relative profit increases in the region of low
quality, and a higher asymmetric information will imply higher profits in the
production of the low quality goods. However, there is a critical asymmetric
level above which the market collapses. This is explained as the breakdown of
ergodicity, i.e., the asymmetry is so high that all those that buy low quality
goods fall down in a trap and stop to trade. From the consumers’ viewpoint,
the incapacity to distinguish high and low quality makes the agent leave the
market.
From the seller’ point of view, it is hard to decide which quality would maxi-
mize her profit. It is necessary to know the value of several parameters from
the market. This is not the mission of economics. In general Economics pro-
vides a theory that explains what will happen given the market set up. The
design of strategies is the business of marketing science. The importance of
general models is provide tools that help us to address this issue.
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